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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)

v.

]

CLIFTON YAZZIE,
Defendant.

]

Case #20040285-CA

REPLY BRIEF OP APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I. YAZZIE'S ISSUE WAS
SUFFICIENTLY PRESERVED
The State makes a bold statement indicating that Yazzie
has failed to preserve his "arguments" and that this Court
See, Brief

should thus not consider them.
9-10.

of Appellee

at pp.

Ironically, the State fails to support this argument

and, in the next sentence claims that Yazzie7s arguments lack
legal and factual support.

Id.

Yazzie properly preserved the issue

As argued further below,
of lack of reasonable

suspicion by the filing and arguing of the motion to suppress
before the trial court.
Specifically, the State argues that Yazzie "expand[ed]
his argument" on appeal.

See, Brief

of Appellee

at p. 9.

The

State takes issue, arguing that Yazzie claims for the first

time

(a) "...that Halliday's prior knowledge of defendant

could not be considered because it was based on a ^mistaken
assumption'

that

defendant

was

never

licensed

in

any

jurisdiction;" and (b) "...that a defendant's criminal history
alone can never establish a reasonable

Id*

suspicion."

Although the State has failed to support their preservation
argument with any legal analysis, Yazzie will show how the
issues were adequately preserved.
The

State

apparently

misunderstands

the

preservation

requirement. The first of the State's issues here is again a
product

of their misconstrued

notions

respecting

Yazzie's

arguments. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by
the court without a jury, a question to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a finding may be made on appeal whether or
not an objection to the finding was made in the trial court.
See, State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, 19 fn. 4, 999 P.2d
1252.
Yazzie

Even a cursory reading of Yazzie's brief shows that
attacks

conforming

the

to the

trial

evidence

court's
and

oral

relied

finding

upon

as

in the

not
trial

court's denial of the motion to suppress at issue herein.
See, Brief

of

Appellant

at pp. 15-17, Argument "C" entitled

"The Facts Do Not Support the Finding That Yazzie Had Not Had

2

a License for a Long Time."

Thus, Yazzie's issue here was

adequately preserved to the extent that it needed to be.
. The second of the State's issues here ignores Yazzie's
entire argument before the trial court.

Yazzie's argument

before the trial court focused completely on the fact that
Halliday did not have reasonable suspicion to pull Yazzie over
when he did so solely based on his knowledge of Yazzie's
criminal history.

Testimony was specifically elicited for

this

this

purpose

suppression

and

hearing.

issue

Yazzie's

is

argued

issue

here

throughout
was more

the
than

adequately preserved.
II. HALLIDAY DID NOT HAVE
THE REQUISITE REASONABLE
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION
A.

The State Misconstrues Yazzie's Argument.

The State1 argues in its brief that "[b]elow, defendant
conceded that if the last encounter had been more recent, the
facts could support reasonable suspicion."
Appellee

at p. 8.

See, Brief

of

In support of their contention, they cite

to Appellant counsel's argument at the hearing on the Motion,
stating "[P]erhaps had the officer stopped him, like in the

1

Capitalized terms not specifically defined herein are
afforded the same meaning as given them in Appellant's
opening brief in this matter.

3

last couple of week[s] of the last - certainly the day before
[sic2]

or certainly five minutes before, and found out the

Mr., ah, Yazzie didn't have a driver's license, than [sic3]
maybe he could have more of a - of an articulable suspicion."
As is obvious by the quote itself, Appellant counsel made no
such concession.
, What Appellant counsel indicated at the hearing on the
Motion was that, had Halliday recently pulled Yazzie over
"...AND found out that Mr. . .Yazzie didn't have a driver's
license..."

then

Halliday

articulable

suspicion.

could

R58

at

have
p.

24

had

more

(emphasis

of

added).

Obviously if an officer was just recently apprized within
last

couple

of

weeks—through

an

the

an encounter—that a certain

individual did not have a driver's license, and then that
individual was again seen driving soon thereafter, those facts
would rise to a level of articulable suspicion since it would
take time to obtain a license after just being cited for
driving without one.

Such is not the fact scenario here,

however, as pointed out by Appellant counsel in that same

2

The error is contained in the quotation of the
Brief
of Appellee
at p. 8 fn. 5, but is not contained in the
original at R58 p. 24.
3

See footnote 2 above.
4

argument.

Hence, the State's brief misconstrues the argument

made by counsel at the hearing on the Motion.
Bw

The State Misstates Halliday's Testimony.

The

State

argues

knowledge—that

that

"[i]ri

sum,

Chief

Halliday7 s

for twenty years and in over one hundred

encounters, defendant never produced a license and was never
seen driving—supports a reasonable articulable suspicion that
defendant was driving illegally on October 15, 2003." Brief
Appellee

at

p.

12.

This

argument

misstates

of

Halliday's

testimony at the hearing on the Motion.
Halliday

testified

that his

department,

not

Halliday

personally, had over a hundred encounters with Yazzie.
Halliday testified that, in only

at pp. 8-9.

R058

ten (10) non-

traffic personal encounters he had with Yazzie, Yazzie had not
produced a driver's license; however, Halliday testified that
he had never specifically asked for a driver's license.
at pp. 7, 16-17.

Id.

Halliday testified that he personally had

never seen Yazzie driving, not that Yazzie had never been seen
driving at all.
It

is

clear

misstatements
argument.

Id.

as

at pp. 6, 15.
that

the

support

State

for

attempts

their

to

otherwise

use

these

unavailing

However, the record is clear on these areas, which

5

are

supportive

of

the

fact

that

no

reasonable

suspicion

existed in this case.
C.

The State Misunderstands the Issue.

Together with those areas argued supra,
to misunderstand the issue altogether.

the State seems

As set forth in their

brief, the State believes that "...the issue is not whether
defendant ever had a Utah license, but whether he was driving
illegally

on

Halliday..."

October

15,

See, Brief

2003,

when

of Appellee

observed

at p. 10.

by

Chief

We agree that

the underlying issue here is not whether Yazzie ever had a
Utah license; however, this information is a factor in the
determination as to the actual issue4, which is not whether
Yazzie

was

reasonable

driving

suspicion

illegally,

to believe

but

he was.

whether

Halliday

had

Unfortunately for the

State, their reliance upon their misunderstanding causes their
argument to fail, as shown below.
(1) The Fruits Do Not Justify the Poisonous Tree.
A police officer who conducts an investigatory stop must
be able to articulate what it is about those facts he or she
4

As previously mentioned supra,
and as argued in the
opening brief, the trial court also believed this was a
factor since it erroneously relied upon its oral finding
that "...it was such a long time that the defendant had
never had a license/' R058 at p. 28.
6

observes which leads to inference of criminal activity; if
officer fails or is unable to do so, his or her suspicion is
classified as mere "hunch" rather than articulable suspicion.
State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537 (Utah App. 1990) . This Court has
long held that it will not condone unconstitutional police
conduct simply because it yields favorable results.
Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992).

State v.

This Court has

especially voiced its concern pertaining to unconstitutional
police conduct that appears to be common practice, yielding a
significant number of individuals who have been subjected to
this conduct.

Id.

at fn. 2.

The State's brief argues that, because Halliday's hunch
was correct, the stop was reasonable.
at p. 10

See Brief

of

Appellee

(indicating issue is whether Yazzie was driving

illegally on October 15, 2003); at pp. 10-11 (indicating that
the

chief

licensed");

"correctly
at p.

10

suspected
(indicating

licensed is irrelevant").

that
that

defendant
M

[w]hy

lacked reasonable suspicion.
As

more

not

he was not

As detailed in Yazzie's opening

brief, Halliday's conduct was unconstitutional

17-23.

was

See,

thoroughly

Brief

discussed

7

in that it

of Appellant
below,

at pp.

Halliday's

"hunch"was still merely a hunch, however, and not capable of
rising to a level of articulable suspicion.

See, Godina-Luna.

(2) Knowledge of Criminal History Alone Does Not
Rise to Reasonable Suspicion,
The State argues that Yazzie is incorrect that "...a
knowledge

of a defendant's

criminal history may never be

considered in determining a reasonable suspicion." See,
of

Appellee

at p. 11.

Yazzie's

brief,

argument

that

which

Brief

First, the State cites to page 20 of
specifically
criminal

the

is

insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion." Brief

of

at p. 20 (emphasis added) citing

29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir. 1994).
has adopted this holding as well.
P.2d

137,

involvement

actual

alone

Appellant

"...prior

contains

143

(Utah

App.

U.S. v. Sandoval,

The Utah Court of Appeals
See, State v. Humphrey/ 937

1997) (holding

that

fact

that

individual previously has been involved in criminal activity,
alone, is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for
stop).
While it is true that knowledge of a defendant's criminal
history may be considered

as

a factor

totality of the circumstances, see
has not argued any other

in determining

Humphrey at 143, the State

factors to be considered.

8

the

The State

attempts

to

individually

set

forth

other

factors,

or on the whole, they

Yazzie's criminal history.

See, Brief

but

when

each pertain
of Appellee

taken

only to

at pp. 7-8.

Halliday testified that his twenty year knowledge of Yazzie is
based only upon law enforcement encounters.

R058 at p. 8.

Halliday's knowledge that Yazzie claimed Utah residency is
irrelevant to the issue before this Court, however, it also is
based only upon prior law enforcement encounters.
6.

Id.

at p.

The fact that Halliday had never seen Yazzie driving a

vehicle only supports Yazzie's argument that Halliday did not
have any prior traffic encounters or the knowledge of any
traffic encounters with Yazzie.

Id.

The State's remaining

factors specifically pertain to Yazzie's criminal history:
Halliday was personally aware of "well over one hundred police
encounters of defendant by local police;" Halliday personally
asked

Yazzie

for

identification

more

than

ten

times;

Halliday's last encounter with Yazzie was approximately one
year prior to the encounter at issue; and during all prior
encounters with Halliday, Yazzie never produced a driver's
license.

Brief

of Appellee

at pp. 7-8.

The States fails to set forth any other factor because
nothing more was elicited or testified to before the trial

9

court since no other factors exist in this matter.

Halliday

pulled Yazzie over based solely on the knowledge of Yazzie's
criminal history.

Absent any other factor to be considered,

Yazzie's criminal history alone is insufficient for a showing
of reasonableness in this matter.

Humphrey at 143; Sandoval

at 542.
(3) Halliday Should Have Contacted Dispatch.
Without

a

reasonable

articulable

suspicion,

Halliday

should have contacted dispatch to confirm or dispel his hunch
that Yazzie was driving without a valid license.

See,

United

States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-687, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 15751576, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985)(discussing factors courts should
consider in determining "whether the police diligently pursued
a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel
their suspicions quickly.").

The trial court agreed with this

contention in its oral findings where it stated that it wished
Halliday would have called dispatch or waited until Yazzie
committed a traffic violation so the case could be a "nobrainer."
brief

that

R058 at pp. 22, 28-29.
if

reasonable

The State concedes in its

suspicion

is

lacking,

Halliday

"...would have been required to contact dispatch to determine

10

the license status before stopping defendant."
Appellee

See, Brief

of

at p. 8 fn. 6.

It is clear that reasonable suspicion was lacking in this
case

and

that

the prosecutor

and

the trial

court

relied

completely on Yazzie's criminal history to determine that the
stop was justified.
contacted

dispatch

It is clear that Halliday should have
and

it

is

concerning

that

this

case

represents his standard practice in these circumstances. R058
at p. 14. This Court should overturn Yazzie's conviction and
reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the
evidence.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Yazzie respectfully
requests that this Court overturn the trial court's Judgment,
reverse

the

trial

court's

denial

of

Yazzie's

motion

to

suppress, and order such other relief as it deems necessary.
DATED this 24th day of January, 2005.

William L. Schultz
Counsel for Appellant
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and
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